Will every unauthorised alteration result in a commercial agreement being unenforceable? Can alterations be so minor that they will not render the contract void? Can criminal as well as civil law principles be relevant? Will an alteration render the contract a "forgery"? In what circumstances will a party be guilty of fraud or deception by attempting to rely on an altered agreement? This article examines a selection of authorities spanning four centuries, with a view to identifying the effects which such alterations can have in relation to the enforceability of a contract, and attempts to answer such questions.
"...it was resolved, that when any deed is altered in a point material, by the plaintiff himself, or by any stranger, without the privity of the obligee, be it by interlineation, addition, rasing, or by drawing of a pen though a line, or through the midst of any material word, that the deed thereby becomes void ... So if the obligee himself alters the deed by any of the said ways, although it is in words not material, yet the deed is void; but if a stranger, without his privity, alters the deed by any of the said ways in any point not material, it shall not avoid the deed."
Henry Pigot's Case (1614)
The issues raised are far from new and the seminal decision in the area was given over 400 years ago. The rule in Pigot's Case, dating from 1614, essentially provides that a material alteration made to a deed after it has been executed renders the deed void, if made without the approval of the parties to it. As the case report puts it:
Master v Miller (1793)
Almost two centuries later, English courts were asked to determine whether the rule in Pigot's Case was confined to deeds or also applied to negotiable instruments. The 1793 Exchequer Chamber decision in Master v Mille concerned the alteration of a bill of exchange, by which the date of payment was brought forward by several days. This alteration was made by a third party after the bill had been accepted by the defendant and without the defendant's knowledge or consent. The entitlement to recover under the bill was acquired by the plaintiff, who had no involvement in its alteration. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the alteration did not invalidate a written instrument, other than a deed, submitting:
"...there is material difference between deeds and bills of exchange. Deeds seldom, if ever, pass through a variety of hands, and are not liable to the same accidents to which bills are, from their negotiability, exposed. There is therefore good reason in the rule which requires that deeds should be strictly kept, and which will not suffer the least alteration in them; but the same rule is not applicable to bills."
All written instruments
Counsel for the defendant argued that the principle in Pigot's Case was not confined to deeds, claiming that:
"On principles of law and sound policy, the plaintiff ought not to recover. The reason of the rule, that a material alteration shall vitiate a deed, is applicable to all written instruments, and particularly to bills of exchange, which are of universal use in the transactions of mankind. And here there was a material alteration in the bill, inasmuch as the time of payment was accelerated."
In finding for the defendant and holding that the alteration rendered the bill of exchange void, Lord Chief Justice Eyre explained the practical reasons for not confining the rule in Pigot's Case to deeds alone. His judgment emphasises the objective of preventing fraud, especially in commercial transactions:
"...there are no witnesses to a bill of exchange, as there are to a deed; a bill is more easily altered than a deed; if therefore courts of justice were not to insist on bills being strictly and faithfully kept, alterations in them highly dangerous might take place, such as the addition of a cypher in a bill for 1001., by which the sum might be changed to 10001. and the holder having failed in attempting to recover the 10001. might afterwards take his chance of recovering the 1001. as the bill originally stood. But such a proceeding would be intolerable."
This view was echoed by Lord Chief Barron MacDonald who emphasised the dangers if the rule were not to cover bills of exchange as well as deeds:
"I see no distinction, as to the point in question, between deeds and bills of exchange; and I entirely concur with my Lord Chief Justice, in thinking there would be more dangerous consequences to follow, from permitting alterations to be made on bills, than on deed."
Twofold rationale
The fact that the prevention of fraud is a key policy objective underpinning the rule is clear from the foregoing. However, an earlier judgment by Grose J. in the same case emphasises that the rationale for the rule in Pigot's Case is twofold. First, the application of the principle deters fraud. Secondly, the alteration of the deed or instrument results in it ceasing to be the deed or instrument of the party with obligations under it. As Grose J. put it:
"The policy of the law has already been stated; namely that a man shall not take the chance of committing a fraud, and, when that fraud is detected, recover on the instrument as it was originally made. In such a case the law intervenes, and says, that the deed thus altered no longer continues the same deed; and that no person can maintain an action upon it ... any alteration in a material part of any instrument or agreement avoids it, because it thereby ceases to be the same instrument; and this principle is founded on great good sense, because it tends to prevent the party in whose favour it is made from attempting to make any alteration in it. This principle too, appears to me as applicable to one kind of instruments [sic] as to another"
Strict application of the rule
A strict interpretation of the rule is evident from the later decision in Burchfield v Moore.8 A bill of exchange, signed by the defendant, required him to pay a certain sum two months after the date on the bill, being 12 November 1853. The bill passed through several hands and, at some later point, a person unknown made an unauthorised alteration, namely, inserting a place of payment in the following terms: "payable at The Bull Inn Aldgate". The plaintiff was the ultimate bona fide purchaser, for value, of the bill and had no notice of the alteration. Despite the fact that the alteration neither increased his liability under the bill nor accelerated his payment obligations, the defendant argued that the alteration rendered the bill void. In his judgment, Lord Campbell C.J. felt himself bound to hold in favour of the defendant. In light of prior authorities, he considered that:
"...such words, although they do not alter the direct liability of the acceptor, do vary the contract between others who are parties to the bill."
Bona fide purchaser without notice
In his Lordship's view, the insertion of a place of payment amounted to a material alteration of the bill. In his view, as soon as it is established that there has been a material alteration, the particular nature of the alteration is itself immaterial, and reliance was placed on the decision in Master v Miller. Although brief, the judgment of Lord Campbell C.J. involved a very strict application of the principle in Pigot's Case and a willingness to hold that an instrument is vitiated by virtue of the unauthorised alteration, notwithstanding the fact that the alteration did not increase--the liability under the contract and regardless of the harsh effect on a bona fide purchaser without notice. His Lordship put it as follows:
"The plaintiff here is a bona fide holder, for value, without notice of the alteration; but the bill must be considered as vitiated in the hands of a prior holder. The defendant was discharged from his liability as acceptor from the moment when the alteration of the bill had been consummated: and, the instrument having ceased in point of law to be an accepted bill, the indorsee afterwards could be in no better situation than the indorser ... the negotiability of bills of exchange is to be favoured; but with this view it is material that their purity should be preserved."
Gardner v Walsh (1855)
The 1855 decision in Gardner v Walsh concerned a group of Manchester merchants who sued on foot of a promissory note, which had been signed in the following circumstances. The plaintiffs agreed to provide a Ms Elizabeth Barton with further credit if she could get two sureties to sign a promissory note, which she would also execute. She proposed the defendant and a Ms Clarke. The defendant agreed to act as a guarantor and signed the note, along with Ms Barton, in the plaintiffs' Manchester office. As the principal debtor, Ms Barton was certainly party to the arrangement whereby Ms Clarke was to sign as an additional surety, but whether the defendant was aware of this was not at all clear from the evidence. It was accepted that Ms Clarke was not present when the defendant and Ms Barton executed the promissory note and confirmed their joint and several obligations under it.
Addition of surety
However, some time later, and without the consent of the defendant, the plaintiffs arranged for Ms Clarke to sign the same document, in her capacity as joint and several guarantor. At the trial, the defendant argued that this amounted to an alteration of the promissory note and a change in a material sense. In summarising the plaintiffs' arguments, Lord Campbell C.J. addressed both the nature of a joint and several guarantee and the effect of an alteration in light of the rule in Pigot's Case:
"The counsel for the present plaintiffs ingeniously argued that the defendant, in signing the promissory note, had entered into two contracts, one separately, and another jointly with Elizabeth Barton: that, although they were both written on the same piece of paper, and expressed in the same sentence, they might be treated as if they had been written on separate pieces of paper respectively signed by the defendant; and that the separate contract on which the present action is brought is not at all affected by the signature of Alice Clarke, which made her a party to the joint contract entered into by the defendant along with Elizabeth Barton. But we must consider that a joint and several promissory note, although it contains two promises in the alternative, is one contract and one instrument, and that, if it is designedly altered in any part by the payee so as to alter the liability of the makers, it is entirely vitiated. According to Pigot's Case (11 Rep. 26b), if the party to a deed makes an alteration in a covenant after the deed is executed, not only the covenant, but the whole deed, becomes void"
Operate differently
The court also rejected the argument that, because the alteration of the document did not affect the liability of the defendant in a material way or cause him prejudice, the plaintiffs could still rely on the promissory note as against him. Nor was there any suggestion of fraud in the case. However, the judgment highlights the willingness of the court to hold that an instrument which had subsequently been altered no longer constituted the instrument of the party with obligations under it. Commenting on the defendant's position, Lord Campbell put it as follows:
"we conceive that he is discharged from his liability if the altered instrument, supposing it to be genuine, would operate differently from the original instrument, whether the alteration be or be not to his prejudice. If a promissory note payable at three months after date were altered by the payee to six months, or if, being made for 1001., he should alter it to 501., we conceive that he could not sue the maker upon it after the alteration, either in its altered or original form. The alleged maker was no party to a note at three months, or for 501.; and the note at six months for 1001., to which he was a party, is vitiated by the alteration"
Suffell v Bank of England (1882)
In Suffell v Bank of England,14 the Court of Appeal considered the plaintiff's action against the bank for the non-payment of notes which were payable to the bearer in circumstances where, before the plaintiff took them, the notes in question had been altered by erasing the numbers on them and substituting others. The plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser, for value, of the notes and carried on business as a money changer in Brussels. He had purchased the bank notes unaware-that a third party had made the alterations apparently to try and prevent the notes from being traced. Payment of the notes had been stopped at the bank and notice of this, with the relevant numbers, had been issued by the defendant.
Alteration which does not affect the contract
A key issue in the case was whether the alteration was material. The court concluded that, even though the alteration did not vary the contract contained in the notes, and so did not fall within the tests of materiality formulated in previous cases, the alteration was material in the sense that it altered the notes in an essential part. The court was also satisfied that the rule in Pigot's Case applied to all written instruments. Confirming this, and commenting on what would constitute a material alteration, Lord Justice Brett said the following:
"such bank note is something more than an instrument containing a contract, or what is evidence of a contract only, it is a thing which is in itself valued as money and as currency. I agree with the argument on the part of the plaintiff that the alteration in this case has not in any way affected the contract. The number on the note is no part of the contract, and therefore if the rule of law insisted upon by the plaintiff be a true rule, viz., that it is only an alteration which affects the contract which vitiates an instrument, then the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. The question therefore must be whether that rule applies further than to an alteration of a contract in an instrument, and if it does, whether the alteration in these notes, which does not affect the contract contained in them, is nevertheless a material alteration. I think the plaintiff is also right in this, that whatever the instrument may be to which the rule is applicable the rule is only applicable where the alteration is material, leaving open the question to be considered what is a material alteration. I incline to think, but it is not necessary to determine this now, that where an instrument contains only a contract, or can only be used as evidence of a contract, no alteration of such an instrument which does not alter or affect the contract, can be a material alteration. But I think the rule is not confined to instruments which contain only a contract. I think it is applicable to instruments which contain no contract at all..."
Business effect
On the question of what would constitute a material alteration in such an instrument, Brett L.J. provided the following analysis:
"Any alteration of any instrument seems to me to be material which would alter the business effect of the instrument if used for any ordinary business purpose for which such an instrument or any part of it is used"
In a separate judgment in the same case, Cotton L.J. also emphasised that, for it to be material, an alteration need not alter the contract and much would depend on the nature of the instrument itself:
"... the question whether an alteration of an instrument is a material one must, in my opinion, depend upon the nature of the instrument and the uses to which it is to be put, and, although in these cases, the proper test may have been whether the contract contained was altered or not, it by no means follows, unless it has been so laid down, that the rule is that the alteration in the contract is essential and that no other alteration will do. In my opinion, that conclusion would be incorrect. The question here is whether the alteration, although not an alteration of the contract, is nevertheless an alteration of the instrument in a material way."
Given the nature of the instruments and the purpose for which the numbers were employed on bank notes, the court was of the opinion that they must be considered an essential part of the notes. Therefore, by altering them, the person who did so made a material alteration of the instrument, rendering them unenforceable. In those circumstances, the bank's appeal succeeded and the plaintiff, who had been successful in the lower court, failed in his case to recover against the bank on foot of the notes in question, despite being a bona fide purchaser, for value, without notice of the alterations.
Raiffeisen Zentralbank v Crossseas Shipping (2000)
Over a century later, Raiffeisen Zentralbank v Crossseas Shipping Ltd18 concerned liability under a guarantee. The Austrian plaintiff bank sought judgment against a Mr Shah, who was resident in Kenya. It was not disputed that the guarantee in question had been signed by Mr Shah, was governed by English law, and conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts. However, Mr Shah argued that the guarantee was void by reason of a material alteration made to it after execution, namely, the insertion by or on behalf of the bank of the name, address, telex and fax numbers of the first-named defendant, Crossseas Shipping Ltd (nCrossseas") as purported agent for Mr Shah in relation to the service of documents. It was accepted in evidence that the relevant clause had been left blank at the time of Mr Shah's signature and that the insertion was made without Mr Shah's knowledge or consent, no discussion having taken place between the bank and Mr Shah in relation to the clause in question or the appointment of an agent for service of any documents. In seeking judgment, the bank argued that Mr Shah would or should have consented to the alteration had he been asked, and that, in any event, the alteration did not prejudice him. The bank also relied on the fact that Cross seas had been the nominated agent for service of notices under previous facilities. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Potter charted the development of the Rule in Pigot's Case over the centuries as follows:
"The terms of the judgment in Pigot's Case only applied to deeds. However the doctrine was extended to all contracts in Master v. Miller. The rule was subsequently stated to be applicable to all written instruments, whether embodying a contract or not: see Suffell v. Bank of Eng/and (1882) 9 O.B.D. 555, 568, per Brett L.J. However, by that time it was clear that the rule applied only to 'material' alterations. In Pigot's Case itself, it was recognised that it did not apply, in the case of alteration by a stranger, to an alteration which was 'not material' and, in Aldous v. Cornwell, L.R. 3 O.B. 573, that exception was extended to an alteration made with the authority of the party in whose custody the document was, again provided that the alteration was not material. In that case a promissory note expressed no time for payment and, while it was in the possession of the payee"
the words 'on demand' were added without the assent of the maker. It was held by the Court of Queens Bench, per Lush J., at p. 579:
"not being bound, we are certainly not disposed to lay it down as a rule of law that the addition of words which cannot possibly prejudice anyone, destroys the validity of the note. It seems to us repugnant to justice and common sense to hold that the maker of a promissory note is discharged from his obligation to pay it because the holder has put in writing on the note what the law would have supplied if the words had not been written."
That was a case in which, at p. 576:
"It was admitted ... that the addition of these words did not alter the legal effect of the instrument, but only expressed what the law would otherwise have implied"
Material alteration
Potter L.J. then focused on the concept of a material alteration and, having reviewed the authorities, with a particular focus on Suffell, Potter L.J. had the following to say in relation to the test:
"Thus, the court in Suffell v. Bank of England appears to have had little doubt that, in the ordinary way, the appropriate test of materiality in the case of a contract or ordinary commercial instrument is whether or not the alteration complained of altered the contractual obligations of the parties in some particular. No reservation or qualification was expressed in respect of the type of category of obligation altered, or in respect of terms going only to minor or procedural aspects of the contract."
In his view, those cases in which an alteration had been held to be immaterial fell into two categories: first, where the alteration either added nothing to, or merely expressed, what the law would otherwise provide or imply; and secondly, where the alteration simply corrected an error which could be cured by parol evidence that a person or entity referred to in the document had been mis-described. He went on to say:
"It is also clear from Suffell v. Bank of England, 9 Q.B.D. 555 that, even where it cannot strictly be said that any alteration in the contractual or other rights of the parties to the instrument has resulted, an alteration may yet be regarded as material where it would nonetheless result in the alteration of the business utility of the instrument when used for an ordinary business purpose. That, however, is as far as the English authorities go"
Modern conditions
Addressing the question of prejudice, Potter L.J. noted that cases like Gardner v Walsh involved a very strict application of the rule in Pigot's Case, even when the alteration in question caused no prejudice whatsoever to the would-be avoider. His Lordship explicitly agreed with the views of Gleeson C.J. in Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Slade and Nelson concerning
"... the need, in modern conditions, to confine the nullifying operation of the rule [in Pigot's Case] to cases which fall strictly within its ambit, and to interpret the rule as liberally and reasonably as possible."
Prejudice
In a departure from the approach in earlier cases, Potter L.J. regarded prejudice as an essential element to attract the rule. In his view, for an alteration to be material, it would also have to result in prejudice, be that potential or actual, before the rule in Pigot's Case would vitiate the document which had been altered. This insistence on prejudice, although in stark contrast to the approach taken in earlier decisions such as Gardner v Walsh, emphasises the original policy objective of preventing fraud. Lord Justice Potter put it succinctly as follows:
"... it seems to me that, to take advantage of the rule, the would-be avoider should be able to demonstrate that the alteration is one which, assuming the parties act in accordance with the other terms of the contract ... is potentially prejudicial to his legal rights or obligations under the instrument. I say 'potentially prejudicial' because I do not think it necessary to show that prejudice has in fact occurred. The rule remains a salutary one aimed at preventing fraud and founded upon inference of fraudulent or improper motive at the time of alteration. It seems to me that, absent any element of potential prejudice, no inference of fraud or improper motive is appropriate."
Turning to the facts of the case, the court was satisfied that Mr Shah's obligations under the guarantee were in no way adversely affected by the alterations to the instrument in question. In circumstances where the alterations related exclusively to service of documents upon Mr Shah who, although having an agent in England, resided in Kenya, Potter L.J. observed:
"... the only potential disadvantage or prejudice which could arise so far as he was concerned would be upon the basis that he might seek to evade service of proceedings upon him personally in respect of his liability under the guarantee. Like the judge, I consider that an unsatisfactory basis on which to apply the rule in Pigot's Case, thereby enabling Mr. Shah to avoid his obligation under the guarantee. On consideration of the authorities ... I do not feel constrained to do so."
Anglo Irish Bank v Collins (2011)
This move away from an overly strict or formulaic application of the rule in Pigot's Case to a focus on the issue of prejudice, can also be seen in recent Irish case law. The 2011 High Court decision of Dunne J. in Anglo Irish Bank Corp Ltd v Collins provides a clear illustration of the application of the rule, as well as an analysis of the court's approach to the principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio. The facts also serve as a cautionary tale for practitioners, however well intentioned, and illustrate how criminal law provisions can interact with civil law principles.
Anglo sought judgment against three defendants in various sums totalling some €6.B million. It was accepted that the defendants had each signed a personal guarantee. However, a key issue in the defence of Anglo's claim, and the allegedly unlawful act, was the admitted alteration of the guarantees by the bank's solicitor, after their execution by the guarantors and without their knowledge. The defendants argued that the alterations in question rendered each guarantee a forgery and prevented Anglo from relying on the documents in order to recover the sums guaranteed.
The nature of the alterations
The evidence given by Anglo's solicitor was that he examined each of the three guarantees which had initially been sent by the guarantors to the bank, and then forwarded to him, after their execution. As a result of this examination, he noticed that each of the guarantors had signed on the wrong page, namely, on a page headed "For Completion by the Borrower". As Dunne J. put it in her judgment:
"He then did something, which in light of these proceedings, I am sure has caused him many sleepless nights. He put a line through the word 'Borrower' on the page headed 'For Completion by the Borrower' and wrote in the word 'Guarantor'"
The solicitor also crossed out a reference to a particular company which erroneously appeared on the same page, and instead wrote in the name of the relevant guarantor in its place on each document. The evidence before the court was that the solicitor also "wrote on the outside of the guarantees on the cover sheet the date which appeared in the body of the document as the date of execution"." The solicitor's evidence was that the alterations made by him were intended to reflect the true position between the parties and that his interventions did not alter what had been agreed. However, he accepted in evidence that there was nothing on the face of the guarantees to show that they had been altered by him.
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001
In opposing the bank's claim for judgment, counsel for the defendants argued that the guarantees, as altered, became "false instruments" within the meaning of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 (the 2001 Act). Furthermore, counsel for the defendants argued that the application of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio prevented Anglo from relying on the guarantees in question, or proceeding with a claim based on previous letters of offer on foot of earlier guarantees, signed by the parties.
Forgery
Counsel for the defendants argued that the actions of Anglo's solicitor amounted to forgery and that each guarantee constituted a forgery in light of the provisions of s.25 of the 2001 Act, which states as follows:
"(1) A person is guilty of forgery if he or she makes a false instrument with the intention that it shall be used to induce another person to accept it as genuine and, by reason of so accepting it, to do some act, or to make some omission, to the prejudice of that person or any other person. (2) A person guilty of forgery is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or both."
Section 26 of the 2001 Act creates the offence of using a false instrument, whereas s.31 provides a definition of the meaning of the words "prejudice" and "induce", and both sections were relied on by the defendants.
False instrument
Counsel for the guarantors also relied on s.30 of the 2001 Act which defines the meaning of "false" and "making". Section 30 states:
"(1) An instrument is false for the purposes of this Part if it purports- (a) to have been made in the form in which it is made by a person who did not in fact make it in that form ... (e) to have been altered in any respect by a person who did not in fact alter it in that respect ... (2) A person shall be treated for the purposes of this Part as making a false instrument if he or she alters an instrument so as to make it false in any respect (whether or not it is false in some other respect apart from that alteration)."
Nature of the obligations
Dunne J. referred to a number of authorities, including the English Court of Appeal's decision in Raiffeisen, as follows:
"It was pointed out on behalf of the Bank that the passage from Raiffeinsen [sic] at p. 1146 makes clear that the test of materiality is whether or not there has been an alteration in the legal effect of the document in relation to the rights and obligations of the parties. Thus, it is clear that an alteration of a guarantee which had the effect of altering the amount of the guarantors' obligation, for example, by changing a figure of €50,000 to €90,000 would be a material alteration"
In analysing the effect of the admitted alterations, Dunne J. made it clear that "[t]he first question I have to consider in this case is whether the alterations made by the Bank's solicitor ... amounted to a material alteration"." Having reviewed the evidence, Dunne J. was satisfied that the defendants intended to, and did in fact, execute the guarantees in their capacity as guarantors and not in any other capacity, stating:
"That being so, I am satisfied that the alterations made ... reflected the intention of the parties, were minor in nature and could not be described as material. The alterations did not affect the nature of the rights and obligations of the defendants. The position would be otherwise if there was evidence to the effect that the alterations changed the nature of the rights and obligations of the defendants"
Intention to prejudice
The court then turned to the alleged breaches of criminal law, specifically the 2001 Act, arising from the alterations to the guarantees after their execution and without the guarantors' consent. Having considered the relevant provisions of the 2001 Act, Dunne J. was satisfied that there was no evidence of the requisite "intention" on the part of the bank or its solicitor, insofar as causing prejudice to the defendants was concerned, holding:
"If one considers the meaning of prejudice as provided for in the Act, neither of the defendants could be said to have lost anything by the alterations, equally it could not be said that the Bank gained an advantage as a result of the alterations. The documents already in existence prior to the execution of the guarantee, included the guarantee of 2005, the facility letter signed by the defendants on the 20th of August 2008, and the letter of their solicitor returning the guarantees, all bear testimony to the existing obligation of the defendants and to the Bank's entitlement to enforce that obligation. The defendants had an obligation to pa~ the sums due in any event. The alterations made in this case are such that it can safely be said that the guarantees are not instrunTents which tell a lie about themselves. On the contrary, it could be said that the alterations made ... were designed to ensure that the guarantees were altered to tell the truth about themselves"
Although commenting that the solicitor's actions were "unwise, to say the least", Dunne J. considered that his conduct was "far removed from constituting the commission of such a serious criminal offence. It is in those circumstances that I am also satisfied that there was no wrongdoing on the part of Anglo". That being so, the maxim of ex turpi causa non oritur actio did not give rise to any defence.
Conclusion
The policy objective of preventing fraud remains as valid today as it was four centuries ago. However, the shift away from a formulaic application of the rule in Pigol's Case is to be welcomed. Surely, the public interest is not best served if obligations under a contract can be avoided where the alteration is minor, there is no question of fraud, and there is no prejudice whatsoever to the obligor. This type of common sense approach, with a focus on prejudice being an essential element for an alteration to be a material one, is certainly evident from the High Court's decision in Anglo v Collins. In an ideal world, no alteration would ever be made to a contract without the knowledge and consent of the parties to it. However, the courts have long recognised that such alterations can and do occur and the rule in Pigol's Case remains an essential common law principle to be applied in a modern context.